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Abstract Societies need markets, so just as trustworthy
professionals are needed in fields such as healthcare, law
and education, modern societies need trustworthy market
managers, including corporate officers and directors. But in
its screening of candidates, U.S. corporate business has
lagged behind fields such as medicine and law, which in
the nineteenth century addressed their need for screening
by upgrading professional education and establishing
licensing of individual practitioners. Corporate business, by
contrast, has been too tolerant of problematic executives,
particularly executives of a type shown by recent research
in psychology to exhibit a set of personality traits including
below average concern about bad effects of their actions on
other people. Over-representation of this problematic type
has cost corporate business the trust and respect it could
earn by resting fully on a time-honored alternative foun-
dation already espoused by many trustworthy teachers and
practitioners of business. Society needs these trustworthy
people of business to work together to establish screening
of candidates for high level corporate positions by
upgrading MBA education and establishing licensing for
these positions. For reasons again based on current findings
in psychology, screening candidates for the MBA could be
significantly strengthened by requiring historical studies,
particularly history of the corporate legal structure in the
U.S. and history of the MBA itself. Upgrading the MBA
and establishing correlated licensing could open the way
toward corrections in the legal form of the corporation to
bring it into line with hospitals, law courts and universities
as places where responsible professionals pursue their
callings on behalf of society.
Keywords Caveat emptor  Corporate structure 
Dark triad  Education  History  Licensing  MBA 
Personality  Stewardship  Temperament
Introduction
Someone who walked onto a used car lot and encountered a
sign saying ‘‘Let the buyer beware’’—the old caveat
emptor—might consider the sign just unusually candid. But
someone who walked into a doctor’s office and encoun-
tered ‘‘Let the patient beware’’ would presumably flee. In
the United States today, people can ordinarily assume that
healthcare professionals are generally committed to seek-
ing the well-being of patients. But medical quacks were a
significant problem in the nineteenth century until the
trustworthy members of the medical profession marginal-
ized quacks by upgrading medical education and estab-
lishing licensing. The American Association of Medical
Colleges, founded in 1876, stated as a commitment that
‘‘medical schools and teaching hospitals continually earn
the trust and support of the public for their special mis-
sions.’’ The National Board of Medical Examiners was
founded in 1915.
Similarly, trustworthy lawyers of the nineteenth century
reformed legal training and established licensing to deal with
a comparable problem of charlatans injuring their profes-
sion. The American Bar Association was founded in 1878
‘‘To serve equally our members, our profession and the
public by defending liberty and delivering justice as
the national representative of the legal profession.’’ The
National Conference of Bar Examiners was established in
1931.
Medicine and law are in need of further reform today to
screen out members who become focused on wealth and
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status in ways that damage their attention to the well-being
of patients and clients. But corporate business has yet to
take even the steps taken by medicine and law in the
nineteenth century, even though the need for reform in
corporate business has been underscored by the economic
collapse of 2008, quite possibly the largest display of
caveat emptor behavior in history, seriously damaging
millions of people. Moreover, caveat emptor practices in
corporate business have contributed significantly to
declines in trustworthiness in medicine and law.
As details of the economic collapse of 2008 have
emerged, a striking feature has been the failure of executives
who contributed to the collapse to acknowledge responsi-
bility beyond the occasional token ‘‘sorry,’’ even when they
have been asked directly in settings such as Congressional
hearings.1 Instead we are seeing continuation of corporate
resistance to regulation, of the huge gap between executive
and worker pay, of resistance to an equitable tax structure,
and of indifference to public goods such as environmental
protection, healthcare, and good schools for all children.
In this situation, the U.S. needs its trustworthy people of
business, who are clearly the great majority, to take active
leadership of their field and work to protect it and their
society from caveat emptor executives. Leadership should
no longer be left to business organizations with very large
lobbying funds who have shown themselves to be part of
the problem rather than of the solution. These organizations
include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business
Roundtable, the Financial Services Roundtable, and the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).
In proposing to today’s trustworthy people of business
an agenda for marginalizing caveat emptor, this essay has
three parts. Part I will identify and characterize two major
sources of caveat emptor thinking in corporate business.
Part II will describe a time-honored alternative to caveat
emptor that already guides trustworthy business today. Part
III will recommend that today’s trustworthy people of
business reform their field as was done by the trustworthy
doctors and lawyers of the nineteenth century by upgrading
business education in a particular way that would help
screen out caveat emptor candidates and by establishing
correlated licensing of high level corporate executives,
both managers and directors.
Two Sources of Caveat Emptor in Corporate Business
The first of the two sources of caveat emptor in corporate
business to be discussed here is a psychological one,
namely a problematic subpopulation of the business
community that has been recognized since antiquity but
that can be better understood today in the light of recent
advances in psychology. The second source is a logical
one, a particular idea too frequently found among these
problematic executives.
The Psychology of Caveat Emptor: Temperament
and Personality
Recent research in psychology has delineated a personality
type for which caveat emptor is likely to be congenial. This
personality is not a clinical disorder, although it has simi-
larities to the clinical disorder psychopathy, which has been
found to be more common among corporate executives
than among, say, social workers or teachers.2 Because the
personality type considered here is not a clinical disorder,
executives of this type seem even more likely than psy-
chopaths to be able to reach high levels in corporations.
1 See, for example, Charles Ferguson’s documentary film about the
2008 collapse, Inside Job.
2 An excellent access point for the current scholarly literature on
executive psychopaths is Clive R. Boddy’s 2011 article ‘‘The
Corporate Psychopaths Theory of the Global Financial Crisis.’’
[Boddy 2011] Boddy notes in this article that although ‘‘corporate
psychopaths are… poorly organized managers who adversely affect
productivity and have a negative impact on many different areas of
organizational effectiveness,’’ it has also been ‘‘shown that psycho-
paths are… to be found at greater levels of incidence at senior levels
of organizations than they are at junior levels…. There is also some
evidence that they may tend to join some types of organizations rather
than others,’’ including large financial organizations.
Boddy offers a very interesting theory to account for this greater
incidence, namely ‘‘that changes in the way people are employed
have facilitated the rise of Corporate Psychopaths to senior
positions.’’ Boddy writes that
Prior to the last third of the twentieth century large corpora-
tions were relatively stable, slow to change and the idea of a
job for life was evident, with employees gradually rising
through the corporate ranks until a position was reached
beyond which they were not qualified by education, intellect or
ability to go. In such a stable, slowly changing environment
employees would get to know each other very well and Cor-
porate Psychopaths would be noticeable and identified as
undesirable managers…. and their rise would therefore be
blocked.
The World Health Organization’s International Statistical Classi-
fication of Diseases and Related Health Problems defines its
counterpart of psychopathy, which it calls dissocial personality
disorder, by a list including the following items especially relevant to
discussion of caveat emptor (World Health Organization 1990):
• ‘‘Callous unconcern for the feelings of others and lack of the
capacity for empathy;
• Incapacity to experience guilt and to profit from experience,
particularly punishment;
• Markedly prone to blame others or to offer plausible rationaliza-
tions for the behavior bringing the subject into conflict;
• Gross and persistent attitude of irresponsibility and disregard for
social norms, rules, and obligations.’’
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A number of discussions of this subclinical personality
are formulated in terms of an influential theory of adult
personality traits, the ‘‘five factor model’’ (FFM). The
following summary of the five factors is offered in the 2001
article ‘‘Effects of Personality on Executive Career Success
in the United States and Europe: (Boudreau et al. 2001).3
Consensus is emerging that a five-factor model of
personality, often termed the ‘‘Big Five’’ (Goldberg
1990), can be used to describe the many salient
aspects of personality…. Evidence indicates that the
Big Five are fairly heritable and stable over time
(Costa and McCrae 1988; Digman 1989), although
the environment undoubtedly plays a role.
The dimensions composing the five-factor model are
neuroticism, extroversion, openness to experience,
agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Neuroticism
represents the tendency to… experience negative
affect such as anxiety, insecurity, and hostility.
Extroversion represents the tendency to be sociable,
assertive, and experience positive affect such as
energy, zeal, and excitement. Openness is the dispo-
sition to be imaginative, unconventional, and auton-
omous. Agreeableness is the tendency to be trusting,
compliant, caring, and gentle. Conscientiousness
comprises two related facets, achievement and
dependability, and has been found to be the major
component of integrity (Hogan and Ones 1997).
The FFM has been used by Nigel Nicholson, Emma
Soane, Mark Fenton-O’Creevy and Paul Willman to char-
acterize a type of ‘‘successful’’ executive as follows:
high extraversion (especially sensation seeking) and
openness supply the motivational force for risk taking;
low neuroticism and agreeableness supply the insulation
against guilt or anxiety about negative consequences,
and low conscientiousness makes it easier to cross [i.e.
transgress] the cognitive barriers of… control, deliber-
ation and conformity (Nicholson et al. 2005).
Earlier in their article these authors write that
A clear Big Five pattern emerges for overall risk pro-
pensity, combining high extraversion and openness
with low neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscien-
tiousness. At the subscale level, [extroversion as]
stimulation-seeking surfaces as a key important
component of risk propensity…. Following [Hans]
Eysenck’s theory of extraversion as a generalized
need for stimulation, the extraversion scale (E) is
expected to follow the pattern predicted… for
sensation-seeking…. Openness to experience (O) can
be seen as a cognitive stimulus for risk seeking—
acceptance of experimentation, tolerance of uncer-
tainty, change and innovation…. Conversely, consci-
entiousness (C), which can be summarized as a desire
for achievement under conditions of conformity and
control, is antithetical to these qualities and can be
predicted to be inversely related to risk-propensity….
The literature also suggests that consistent risk-takers
require resilience…, which would suggest that they
should also score low in emotional sensitivity, impli-
cating the neuroticism (N) dimension of personality.
The same logic could be applied to agreeableness (A),
the tough to tender-mindedness dimension. Robust
self-interest, and a lack of concern for the conse-
quences to others of one’s risk taking, could help to
underpin the risk-taker.
Related findings come from psychological research on innate
qualities in infants and children, called qualities of ‘‘tem-
perament’’ to distinguish them from qualities gained from
experience that combine with innate qualities to form what
psychologists label ‘‘personality.’’ Since the FFM qualities
have been found to be ‘‘fairly heritable,’’ i.e., to have innate
elements, people cannot be simply ‘‘talked out’’ of these
qualities. Therefore, while society needs to offer what
psychologists call ‘‘prosocial’’ occupations for all adults, it is
especially important to offer prosocial occupations for those
who show the personality described above in terms of the
FFM as low N, A, and C combined with high E and O. We
shall see that writers as diverse as Plato and William James
have discussed war as being attractive to people who seem to
show a similar personality.
The idea of innate qualities has often been resisted in
the Anglo-American egalitarian tradition, which rests on
foundations that include John Locke’s seventeenth-cen-
tury restatement of Aristotle’s claim that every human
mind starts off as ‘‘a blank slate,’’ a tabula rasa. This
tradition therefore tends to view personality as formed by
experience alone, entirely by ‘‘nurture’’ as contrasted to
‘‘nature.’’ However, commitment to the equality of
opportunity and rights fundamental to democracy does not
require that all infants start off alike. For example, society
benefits from the fact that some children are born with
special gifts in the arts. Society does not need to know
which infants and toddlers have these innate potentials.
Society only needs to keep in mind that if it wants the
insight and riches the arts bring, it needs to provide
pathways for artistic development, pathways open to all
children who may wish to try them. The same is true for
all other innate gifts that can benefit society: society does
not need to label individual children, but it does need to
provide pathways.
3 Another sketch of the five and a brief history of the FFM are offered
by Kowert et al. (1997).
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In research on innate temperament particularly relevant to
efforts to minimize caveat emptor, psychologist Jerome
Kagan and others have found that if four-month old infants
are suddenly presented with something unfamiliar and
unexpected, such as a clown, their responses tend to fall into
four groups. Some infants will cry and also wave their arms
and legs, some will cry but not move so much, some will
move a lot but not cry so much, and some will not do much of
either. (e.g., Kagan 1997) Research has shown that each of
these four patterns involves a different brain pattern.
To illuminate differences, research has focused on the
two groups most different from each other, even though
the majority of infants belong to the intermediate groups.
The infants who both cry and wave their limbs are known
as ‘‘high reactives,’’ and the infants who do little of either
are known as ‘‘low reactives.’’ These differences at four -
months have been found to correlate significantly with
differences among toddlers in such things as how much
they do or do not tend to move away from their caregiver to
explore a new environment, with the low reactives more
likely to be the ones who go exploring. For these differ-
ences among toddlers, the terms ‘‘inhibited’’ and ‘‘unin-
hibited’’ are used as counterparts of ‘‘high reactive’’ and
‘‘low reactive’’, with the majority of children again
between these two most contrasting groups.4 These early
differences have been found to correlate significantly with
behavioral and associated neurological patterns in adults.5
Research has found that the low reactive/uninhibited
children are the most likely to develop into older children
whose attention is externally oriented rather than reflective,
who seek stimulation and enjoy risk, and who are more
resistant to regulation and more likely to cheat. These
children are significantly less likely than the high reactive
infants/inhibited toddlers to be ‘‘empathic’’ about others or
aware of the effects of their actions on others. They are
more likely to act impulsively and to transfer blame for
their errors to someone else or to some aspect of their
environment. Interestingly, these low reactive/uninhibited
children tend to exhibit more frequent smiling and are more
likely than the high reactive/inhibited children to seek to
belong to a team or group of similar children.
Although Kagan’s focus in this research has been on
innate temperament, he has always also affirmed the great
importance of nurture. He writes as follows about the low
reactive/uninhibited children:
Individuals who belong to this temperamental cate-
gory who are raised in affectionate homes that
encourage accomplishment and are fortunate enough
to attend good schools are likely to become adults
who enjoy high risk vocations, such as politics,
investment, and trial law. But the same children are at
risk for a criminal career if they grow up in … homes
in which aggressive behavior is incompletely social-
ized and their neighborhoods contain temptations for
delinquent acts. Thus, the same temperamental (i.e.,
innate) bias can lead to different [adult] personalities
when development occurs in distinctive settings
(Kagan 2008).
The high reactive/inhibited children, by contrast, are at
greater risk of becoming withdrawn and depressed adults if
they grow up in an environment that does not protect them
from being overwhelmed and thereby prevented from
developing into the perceptive, empathic adults so many of
them have the potential to become. Thus, it is important for
society to provide a wide range of pathways to enable
children of the whole range of temperaments and talents to
develop into prosocial adults. However, it is from the low
reactive/uninhibited children that caveat emptor adults are
most likely to emerge, and so they are the focus here.
In thinking about prosocial outcomes for these children,
researchers have developed a useful distinction between
‘‘reactive’’ aggression, which is ‘‘an impulsive and hostile
act displayed in response to a perceived threat or provo-
cation,’’ and ‘‘proactive’’ aggression, which is ‘‘a nonpro-
voked aversive means of influencing another.’’ High
reactive/inhibited children are more likely to exhibit only
reactive aggression, while low reactive/uninhibited chil-
dren are the ones likely to engage in proactive aggression
as well (Poulin and Michel 2000). These differences have
been found to relate to the development of conscience in
children, with the development more difficult for proac-
tively aggressive children, who tend to be lower in empa-
thy for others and less aware of the impact of their actions
on others. Proactively aggressive children also tend to be
less responsive to punishment than inhibited, internalizing
children, who may be even too responsive to punishment,
becoming all the more withdrawn.
Just as high reactive/inhibited children benefit from
being supportively encouraged to explore more freely, so it
is important that limits be clearly set and maintained for
low reactive/uninhibited children. But this limiting needs
4 Noted researchers Mary Rothbart and John E. Bates write that ‘‘a
child easily overwhelmed by stimulation [a high reactive child] will
try to keep things quiet, whereas a child who requires a high level of
stimulation for pleasure [a low reactive child] will attempt to keep
things exciting.’’ (Rothbart and bates 1998)
5 E.g., Dr. Carl E. Schwartz and colleagues at Massachusetts General
Hospital reported in Archives of General Psychiatry, January, 2010,
that
Adults with a low reactive infant temperament, compared with
those categorized as high reactive, showed greater thickness in
left orbitofrontal cortex. Subjects categorized as high reactive
in infancy, compared with those previously categorized as low
reactive, showed greater thickness in the right ventromedial
prefrontal cortex. (Schwartz et al. 2010).
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to be done in a way that affirms the child and works to draw
the child into empathic relationships.
Since it is from among the uninhibited, excitement-
seeking, proactively aggressive, low-empathy risk takers
that caveat emptor adults are more likely to emerge, it is
helpful that they have been considered by researchers
working from a variety of theoretical approaches. For
example, an insightful study by Professor Patricia H.
Hawley sorted a sample of 1,700 fifth to tenth grade chil-
dren into five groups according to what she called their
‘‘control of resources’’ [Hawley 2003]. The groups were
‘‘Coercive controllers’’ (children who used proactive
aggression to get what they sought and were ‘‘more con-
cerned to get ahead than to get along’’), ‘‘Prosocial con-
trollers’’ (children who sought to achieve objectives
through cooperative approaches and were ‘‘more concerned
to get along than to get ahead’’), ‘‘Bistrategic controllers’’
(children who used both aggression and cooperation),
‘‘Subordinates’’ (children who did not control and were
more likely to be controlled), and the largest group,
‘‘Typicals’’ (children between the Controllers and the
Subordinates). Table 1 is an abbreviated version of one of
Hawley’s tables, simplified to show only the rank order of
the five groups of children.
Because Hawley is studying older children, we cannot
know from her findings the balance of socialization and
innate temperament involved in these figures. It should also
be noted that all five groups of children include significant
numbers of both boys and girls, although not in the same
proportions.6
Hawley is particularly interested in the children she calls
‘‘Bistrategic,’’ the children who are concerned both to
‘‘get along’’ and ‘‘get ahead’’ and who are the most relevant
for understanding ‘‘successful’’ caveat emptor executives.
These Bistrategic children are perceived by both their peers
and themselves as having the most control of resources,
while being second to only the prosocial controllers in
‘‘likeability/agreeableness’’ and in ‘‘perceived popularity.’’
Also, the Bistrategic children are considered by both their
peers and themselves to be more agreeable and to have
more control of resources than the Coercive children.
However, the Bistrategics share with the Coercives the
top spot for self-rated cheating. In addition, the Bistrategics
are ranked number one in aggression by both their peers
and themselves, although Hawley reports that teachers see
the Bistrategics as less aggressive than the Coercives.
(Could it be that it is easier for a ‘‘Bistrategic’’ child to pull
the wool over the eyes of a teacher than of a peer?)
A major question about Hawley’s Bistrategics that is
important for understanding the psychology of caveat
emptor adults is whether there are actually two kinds of
sociality: an instrumental, potentially exploitative ‘‘social
Table 1 Relative ratings on
qualities of the children in
Hawley’s groups (Scale goes
from 1 = highest to
5 = lowest)
Bistrategic Coercive Prosocial Typical Subordinate
Self rating
Agreeableness 2 4 1 3 5
Aggression 1 2 4 3 5
Resource control 1 2 2 4 5
Cheating 1 1 4 3 5
Peer rating
Perceived popularity 2 3 1 4 5
Aggression 1 2 3 4 5
Resource control 1 3 2 4 5
Percent of all children 17.5 % 17 % 15 % 35.5 % 15 % = 100 %
Table 2 Gender distribution (constructed from data included in
Hawley’s article)
A. Percent of boys and of girls belonging to each of the five types of
controllers
Boys Girls





Total 100 % 100 %
B. Percent of each of the five types made up of boys and of girls
Boys Girls Total
Bistrategic 56 % 44 % 100 %
Coercive 71 29 ‘‘
Prosocial 41 59 ‘‘
Typical 43 57 ‘‘
Subordinate 44 56 ‘‘
6 This variation in gender balance among the five groups can be seen
in the two charts below, which I have constructed from data in
Hawley’s article. After adjusting for the small difference between the
total numbers of boys and of girls in the study, the charts work out as
in Table 2
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savvy’’ or ‘‘shrewdness’’ found in the Bistrategic children
and a more ‘‘empathic’’ sociality that makes the Prosocials
number one in ‘‘perceived popularity.’’ Could it be that it is
a lack of either of these two types of sociality that reduces
the ‘‘pure’’ Coercives to fourth in ‘‘Perceived popularity’’?
The subtitle of Hawley’s article appears to recognize this
difference between instrumental and empathic forms of
sociality. Even though she finds much about the Bistrategic
children that is positive, the fact that they rank themselves
number one in both cheating and aggression, and are
ranked number one in aggression by their peers, seems to
be what leads Hawley to label them ‘‘Machiavellian’’ and
to give her essay the subtitle ‘‘A case for the well-adapted
Machiavellian.’’
Hawley’s ‘‘Machiavellians’’ share that label with an
adult personality type similar to what is here seen as the
caveat emptor adult. A growing literature joins subclinical
Machiavellianism, narcissism and psychopathy in what is
called ‘‘The Dark Triad.’’7
Obviously the above sketches of temperament and per-
sonality are not sufficient for identifying any particular
individual as fitting these profiles or any others. But iden-
tifying individuals is unnecessary for recognizing that
research in temperament and personality indicates that
societies should expect that among their members will be a
significant number who show Hawley’s ‘‘bistrategic’’ pat-
tern. Societies therefore needs to give attention to what
prosocial activities can be provided for members of this
type, as for all types, and what childhood experiences could
be helpful in minimizing the production of caveat emptor
adults.
Although current psychologists are casting important
new light on differences in temperament and personality,
they are certainly not the first to notice them. For example,
both Plato and William James observed that some humans
appear to be temperamentally drawn to war for its own
sake. They are not thinking of the insane butchers who are
regarded with horror as war ‘‘criminals,’’ nor of people
who reluctantly go to war to defend against attackers. They
are thinking of people who like war for its excitement and
riskiness. Since it is hard to imagine someone approving of
war for its excitement without having considerable indif-
ference to war’s effects on others, i.e., without being low in
empathy, these discussions by Plato and James cast light on
the question of caveat emptor.
Plato presents as the main speaker of his Statesman an
‘‘Eleatic Stranger’’ who holds that one of the tasks of the
true statesman will be to ‘‘weave together’’ like the warp
and woof of cloth two naturally occurring types of citizens
whose effects can be balanced by this weaving. The Eleatic
Stranger says that without this balancing,
those who are too peaceful wind up as slaves, while
those drawn to andreia [literally ‘‘manliness’’ but
usually translated as ‘‘courage’’] urge their countries
to war because of their excessive desire for a warlike
life.’’ (Plato 1997a: Statesman 307–08)8
Similarly, William James, using the word ‘‘moral’’ in
the now obsolete sense in which it served as a catchall for
all inquiries not part of natural science, and writing in the
time of Theodore Roosevelt’s enthusiasm for war, gave in
1906 a talk entitled ‘‘The Moral Equivalent of War.’’
(James 1906) In this talk, James endorses the view that
some human qualities are innate, and that society therefore
needs to provide constructive outlets for them. In particu-
lar, James wrote of the person who
inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of
glory of his ancestors. Showing war’s irrationality
and horror is of no effect on him…. War is the strong
life; it is life in extremis.
James further wrote that
The weakness of … merely negative criticism is
evident—pacifism makes no converts from the mili-
tary party. The military party denies neither the
bestiality nor the horror nor the expense; it only says
that these things tell but half the story. It only says
that war is worth them…. So long as antimilitarists
propose… no moral equivalent of war,… so long they
fail to realize the inwardness of the situation…. The
duties, penalties, and sanctions pictured in the utopias
they paint are all too weak and tame to touch the
military minded.
The alternative James proposed for ‘‘the military minded’’
was organized national service. His proposal is seen by Jon
Roland in his ‘‘Introduction’’ to James’s essay as leading
directly ‘‘to the depression-era Civilian Conservation
Corps, to the Peace Corps, VISTA, and AmeriCorps.’’
(Roland 2000) James wrote that
To coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing
fleets in December, …. to road building and tunnel-
making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the
frames of skyscrapers, would… youth be drafted
off… and … come back into society with healthier
sympathies and soberer ideas…. [U]ntil an equivalent
7 A good starting place for study of the ‘‘Dark Triad’’ is ‘‘The Dark
Triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopa-
thy’’ by Paulhus and Williams in the Journal of Research in
Personality in 2002.
8 Statesman, 306-end. Plato notes the difference between these
qualities in Book III of the Republic as well, although he there seems
to see them as more combinable in single individuals than he does in
the Statesman, generally considered to be a later dialog.
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is organized, I believe that war must have its way.
But I have no serious doubt that the ordinary prides
and shames of social man, once developed to a cer-
tain intensity, are capable of organizing such a moral
equivalent as I have sketched.
James’s examples would need revision to fit today’s
technology and would also need extension to higher ages
to provide for citizens of this personality type throughout
their working lives. In addition to developing prosocial
occupations for these citizens, we need to make every effort
to help all children, but especially low reactive/uninhibited
children have the empathic relationships and other experi-
ences needed to help them develop into prosocial adults.
The Logical Root of Caveat emptor
Keeping in mind this discussion of a psychological root of
caveat emptor behavior, let us consider a logical root, an
idea that is like the psychological root in being overrep-
resented in today’s corporate business.
This logical root of caveat emptor is its suggestion that
the relationship between seller and buyer is a kind of
contest. This notion of contest is not accepted for profes-
sional relationships such as doctor and patient or teacher
and student. However, particularly since World War II
produced the upsurge in computers that was followed by an
upsurge in game-thinking in many areas, the language of
contest, especially games, has become particularly com-
mon in business. Let us look first at some examples and
then at what thinking of business as a game can encourage
and seem to justify in caveat emptor executives.
Perhaps the very ubiquity of the language of games in
business today explains why it has not been sufficiently
challenged. The legendary CEO of General Electric, Jack
Welch, saw no need to give evidence for his assertion that
‘‘business is a game, and winning that game is a total
blast.’’ This claim opens his 2005 bestseller, Winning,
whose dust jacket carries the following blurb from Tom
Brokaw, then managing editor of the NBC Nightly News:
Reading Jack Welch’s plain-language, high-energy
book Winning is like getting the playbook of the
Super Bowl champions before the game. It’s a big
head start on how to master the corporate game from
the entry level to the corporate suites.
The language of corporate business as a game is par-
ticularly common in a genre of books like Welch’s that are
especially prominent in airport bookstores. Another of
these ‘‘airport books’’ is The Game-Changer by the CEO of
Procter and Gamble, A.G. Lafley, and Ram Charan (2008). It
opens with a definition of ‘‘game-changer’’ as ‘‘a visionary
strategist who alters the game his business plays or
conceives an entirely new game.’’ And there is Touch-
down: Achieving Your Greatness on the Playing Field of
Business (and Life) by Dr. Kevin Elko. (Elko 2009). Its
dust jacket says that ‘‘Kevin’s appeal in the sports world
translates directly to the corporate arena.’’
These ‘‘airport books’’ are profitable for publishers, and
many major presses today have business imprints alongside
their cookbook and murder mystery imprints. The Harvard
Business School Press told Publishers Weekly in March,
2000, that ‘‘We invest a lot of effort and resources selling
our books into airport stores, because we want them
exposed to the business travelers.’’
The language of business as a game can also be found in
academic business writing. For example, ‘‘How Banks
Played the Leverage Game’’ is the title of an essay by Stern
School of Business Professors Acharya and Schnable in
Restoring Financial Stability, a 2009 anthology about the
2008 economic collapse.
Thinking of business as a game can offer many attrac-
tions for a practitioner of caveat emptor. Let us consider
the following four:
1. Regarding business as a game can provide a license to
disregard economically vulnerable members of society.
2. Focusing on the goal of winning a game can divert
attention from the question of whether the game should
even exist.
3. Viewing business as a game connects it to team sports
and war, activities that societies have long accepted.
4. Thinking of business as a game requires thinking of it
as an activity organized by rules, since rules are
needed to make determination of winners possible. But
thinking in terms of rules can lead in some people to
looking for ways rules can be ‘‘worked around,’’ ways
such as loopholing, rigging, and outright cheating.
How viewing business as a game can provide a license
to disregard society’s vulnerable members can be seen by
looking at parallels between the business and sports sec-
tions of newspapers. When we turn to the sports pages to
catch up on our favorite teams or athletes, we do not expect
to find ourselves reading about the people who sweep the
stadium or sleep on the sidewalks outside of it. The sta-
dium sweepers and sidewalk sleepers are not part of the
teams, nor are they ticket-buying fans who help finance the
teams (and the marketers and bookmakers). The sweepers
and sleepers are not even the losers. They are simply not
part of the game at all, not people whom teams or sports
page writers or readers need to think about when they think
about their favorite sports.
Consideration of society’s sweepers and sleepers is also
simply absent from airport business books, an absence
which is unsurprising if society’s vulnerable are perceived
as not relevant to the games with which airport books are
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concerned.9 The corporations and teams are just keeping their
minds focused on the game, as players are expected to do.
Although consideration of the economically vulnerable
is absent from the airport books, there is a popular view of
poverty that gamesters can use in reply if their neglect of
poverty is questioned, namely the view that the poor have
brought poverty on themselves by being lazy and failing to
better themselves in this land of opportunity. The spuri-
ousness of this reply was shown by a report by the Eco-
nomic Mobility Project of the Pew Charitable Trust in
2007, i.e., before the 2008 collapse, that found the U.S.
much lower in economic mobility and much higher in
income inequality than other advanced nations, specifically
European countries and Canada. Commenting on the Pew
and similar reports, Nobel Prize economist Paul Krugman
has written that
Americans are much more likely than citizens of
other nations to believe that they live in a meritoc-
racy. But this self-image is a fantasy: …America
actually stands out as the advanced country in which
it matters most who your parents were, the country in
which those born on one of society’s lower rungs
have the least chance of climbing to the top or even to
the middle (Krugman 2012).
A second attraction of viewing business as a game is that
the questions of how to play and win the game are inde-
pendent of the question of whether is it good for the game
to exist at all. Thus, the question of how to play and win at
poker is distinct from the question of whether it is a good
idea to play poker at all. There is nothing in the rules and
strategy of any game that forces its players to address the
question of whether the game itself may be something
society would be better off without. For example, society
would be better off without the tobacco, predatory lending
and fast food ‘‘games,’’ all of which reflect in their exec-
utives and marketers what we may call a ‘‘willingness to
harm.’’ The kind of thinking required for deciding whether
a game should exist at all can seem to a gamester an
unwelcome and too difficult distraction from the kind of
thinking required for skill and victory in the game.
A third attraction of thinking of business as a sport is the
opportunity it offers for explicit and indeed celebrated
competition. Competition between groups or teams or
armies goes beyond competition within a group, the sort of
individual competition that occurs when, e.g., violinists in
an orchestra compete to become concertmaster. The com-
petition among individuals that tends to be present in any
group activity requires considerable diplomacy to handle
gracefully, whereas the competition between teams can be
thrilling in its overtness, its permission and even encour-
agement to ‘‘destroy’’ the opponent.
Team competition also creates bonds of ‘‘team spirit’’
among team members. These bonds have their counterpart,
or perhaps their prime instance, in the ties that can lead a
soldier to die for buddies in war.
An airport book based on similarities between war and
corporate business is Business as War: Battling for Com-
petitive Advantage, published in 2004 by Kenneth Allard,
an Army colonel who became an MSNBC commentator on
business and military affairs and a lecturer in Management
at the University of Texas (Allard 2004). The dust jacket
blurbs include the following:
‘‘In war, they don’t give out medals for second place.
In business as in war, you can’t win without first sur-
viving. Increasingly, the business landscape looks
more like a battlefield than a boardroom or shop floor.
Written in a style that is ‘pure Allard,’ Business as War
offers the hard-won wisdom from one warrior’s world
to another. Read, laugh, squirm, survive, and win!’’
Scott A. Snook, Professor of Organizational
Behavior, Harvard Business School
‘‘In the post-9/11, post-Enron environment, Ken
Allard’s Ten Commandments of Military Leadership
are directly applicable to today’s business CEOs.’’
Tom Petrie, Vice-chairman of Merrill Lynch
The dust jacket of Business as War also reflects the way
the business suit provides executives with a uniform
analogous to those of soldiers and sports team members.
On the back is a full-length photo of Colonel Allard
wearing battle fatigues and standing feet apart with arms
folded across his chest in classic drill sergeant pose. On the
front is Mr. Allard in the same pose but now wearing the
business suit. It has been interesting to watch leaders of the
upstart electronics industry such as Steve Jobs and Bill
Gates challenge the business suit. However they have not
done nearly as much to promote departure from the suit as
the media have done to narrow even the choice among
suits, since dark suits are more flattering for today’s camera
lights and lenses. Business suits can, of course, vary
enormously in price, but in a news photo these differences
fade, and as U.S.-style corporate business has spread
around the world, the media increasingly feature photos of
international groups of executives and politicians almost all
wearing the dark business suit, even when the group
includes people from cultures whose leaders traditionally
dress in flowing robes or other traditional garments. The
9 I am not aware of any airport book which has had the hutzpah to
promote the bottom-feeding business ‘‘games’’ which actually target
the poor, games of actively exploiting them, of finding ways to siphon
off what little money may come their way. The paycheck cashing
racket is one that has received some public notice, and a concise
introduction to this and other such rackets is provided by T. B. Edsall
in his article ‘‘Is poverty a kind of Robbery?’’ (Edsall 2012).
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relatively few women who appear in these photos are still
trying to figure out what to wear as they enter the world of
the business suit.
Sports teams and armies and corps of executives are
similar not just in liking uniforms but also in ability to
consider defeat of rivals a sufficient reason to exist, so that
selling harmful products is acceptable if it can be a path to
becoming a winner as measured by wealth and power. By
contrast, music and theatre groups and small local busi-
nesses can thrive without any other such organizations
around, because these organizations are energized by
something other than conquest.
Thus in corporate business, the various ‘‘industries’’ can
be thought of as leagues, and through the convenient
measure provided by dollars, we can check the standings
daily through the stock and bond price listings that the New
York Times for decades called the ‘‘Market Scoreboard.’’
The corporations as competing teams take to the field, and
we look on, placing our bets via the stock and bond mar-
kets, exchanging opinions with other fans, or expressing
them in our columns or blogs if we are the sort of business
pundit who is a counterpart of sports writers.
A fourth attraction of viewing business as a game can be
exploiting the possibilities of rules. Rules are necessary to
games for determining winners, and in fact, any activity
that has clear enough rules can be turned into a game and
thus make winning a possible reason for participating. But
although rules are needed to make a game and are gener-
ally respected by most participants, they can seem con-
straining to some participants, especially those who by
temperament are relatively resistant to limits and low in the
‘‘conscientiousness’’ and ‘‘agreeableness’’ factors of the
FFM. Three ways such players may deal with inconvenient
rules are cheating, loopholing, and rigging.
Cheating has been found to be even more frequent
among business students than among students in other
fields. A 2006 study reported that while cheating was high
in many graduate programs, it was highest among MBAs at
56 % (McCabe 2006). This article also reported a 1997
survey of undergraduates which similarly found that while
cheating was high among all undergraduates (66 %), it was
highest among business majors (84 %).
A particularly blatant and well-documented manifesta-
tion of cheating in the context of the 2008 collapse has
been the manipulation by bankers of the so-called LIBOR,
the ‘‘London Interbank Offered Rate,’’ a rate at which
banks lend to one another. A spokesman of the U.S.
Department of Justice stated that
Because mortgages, student loans, financial deriva-
tives, and other financial products rely on LIBOR and
EURIBOR [European Interbank Offered Rate] as
reference rates, the manipulation of submissions used
to calculate those rates can have significant negative
effects on consumers and financial markets
worldwide.10
David Enrich, European banking editor for The Wall
Street Journal, explained that the LIBOR
is arranged by a trade group of banks in London.
Every day around lunchtime in London, about 16
banks submit to the British Bankers’ Association data
that is an estimate of how much it would cost those
banks to borrow from each other. (Enrich 2012)
The ‘‘Statement of Facts’’ appended to the Justice Depart-
ment’s June, 2012, statement of its settlement with one of
the major banks involved, Barclays, includes many illus-
trations of what bank employees were doing with the
LIBOR.11 Here are two samples:
…on Monday, March 13, 2006, at approximately
7:48 a.m., Trader-1 wrote to Submitter-1:
‘‘… [Clients] were screaming at me about an
unchanged 3 m[onth] libor. As always, any help wd
[would] be greatly appreciated. What do you think
you’ll go for 3 m[onth]?’’ Submitter-1 responded, ‘‘I
am going 90 altho[ugh] 91 is what I should be post-
ing.’’ Trader-1 replied in part: ‘‘I agree with you and
totally understand. Remember, when I retire and
write a book about this business your name will be in
golden letters….’’ Submitter-1 replied, ‘‘I would
prefer this not be in any books!’’ Barclays’s 3-month
Dollar LIBOR submission on March 13, 2006 was
4.90 %….’’
‘‘We’re getting killed on our 3 m[onth] resets, we
need them to be up this week before we roll out of our
positions. Consensus for 3 m today is 4.78 - 4.7825, it
would be amazing if we could go for 4.79…Really
appreciate ur help mate.’’ (ellipses in original). Sub-
mitter-2 responded, ‘‘Happy to help.’’ Barclays’s
3-month Dollar LIBOR submission on February 22,
2006 was 4.79 %.’’
Gretchen Morgenson, one of the most insightful and
earliest analysts of the crash of 2008, commented on the
apparent tendency of the leaders of the banks involved to
evade responsibility:
Manipulating the Libor is a big deal because it affects
the cost of money for almost everyone…. One of the
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came when a bank official tried to describe why
Barclays’s improper postings were not as problematic
as those of other banks. ‘‘We’re clean but we’re dirty-
clean, rather than clean–clean,’’ an executive said in a
phone conversation. Talk about defining deviancy
down. ‘‘Dirty clean’’ versus ‘‘clean clean’’ pretty
much sums up Wall Street’s view of cheating. If
everybody does it, nobody should be held account-
able if caught….. Wall Street is pushing back, espe-
cially on the Commission’s proposal that swap
execution facilities provide market participants,
before they buy or sell, with easily accessible prices
on ‘‘a centralized electronic screen.’’ The Commis-
sion’s rule would eliminate the one-to-one dealings
by telephone that are so lucrative to traders and so
expensive to investors.(Mogenson 2012)
A way to escape the constraints of rules without actually
cheating is to identify loopholes. Widespread tolerance for
this may be illustrated by our approach to our taxes each
April. If any of us (or H.R. Block) finds a loophole, it is
ours to exploit for as long as it lasts. American multina-
tionals, thanks to attorneys specializing in tax law, usually
manage to pay only about half of the mandated 35 %
corporate tax rate, with GE, for example, paying only
7.4 % in 2010 (Nocera 2011). Laws and regulations can
offer gamesters and their lawyers the same exciting chal-
lenge that computer systems offer hackers: how to ‘‘out-
smart’’ them.
Recognition of corporate loopholing as common prac-
tice is widespread enough for the cartoonist P.C. Vey to
have played upon it in the New Yorker at the time Con-
gress was debating the Dodd-Frank regulatory bill which
became law in early 2010. It remains to be seen whether
corporate lobbying will prevent Dodd-Frank from being
given rules of application that give it actual strength:
(Vey 2009).
Cheating and loopholing bring up the role of umpires,
who are not needed in the arts but are needed in sports
to decide whether a given action is within the rules and to
penalize infractions. But there are ways for gamesters to
get around umpires: they can be pressured or bribed or
things can simply be done out of their view. Thus umpires
can unintentionally contribute to violations simply by
existing, since responsibility for the rules can then be
shifted to them, freeing players to do whatever they can
‘‘get away with.’’ Although it is true that the present eco-
nomic crisis has spotlighted a pressing need to strengthen
regulatory oversight, particularly the oversight of the
financial industry weakened by federal government
administrations from Reagan forward, it would be a mis-
take to forget that for gamesters, working around the
umpire can be just another aspect of the game.
In addition to cheating and loopholing, another way to
deal with rules is to get the rule makers to rig them in one’s
favor. We will look later at the long history of rigging the
law to benefit U.S. corporations, rigging which has mostly
been done through the courts and legislatures, exploiting
the fact that the general public usually does not follow
court and legislative actions closely enough to focus upon
and resist what is being done.
It should also be noted again that the rules that define
a game do not address the question of whether it is
good for that game to exist at all. Furthermore, game
and war thinking in business cannot be dismissed as
‘‘just metaphors.’’ Metaphors can shape our thinking in
major ways even when we do not realize it, and meta-
phor can become reality. Thus, corporate competition is
a game if enough practitioners (and spectators) see it
that way.
In the light of these discussions of psychological and
logical roots of caveat emptor gamesterism, we can ask
ourselves what a nation might look like if too many posi-
tions of power in corporate and political and military
structures came to be held by caveat emptor gamesters, call
them CEGs, with their externalizing quest for excitement
through risk and competition; their tendency to think any
damage done by their game is due to circumstances or
other people; their deficiency in empathy; and their dis-
position to disregard people they see as outside their game.
Might not a nation with too many caveat emptor gamesters
in positions of power look, alas, very much as the U.S.
looks today?
If the U.S., and the world increasingly shaped by U.S.
corporate business, are to extricate themselves from the
dangers of caveat emptor gamesterism, the trustworthy
people of business need to establish the MBA and
Fig. 1 Cartoon by P.C. Vey, New Yorker, March 9, 2009
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corporate business on a foundation that makes corporate
careers less attractive and accessible to caveat emptor
gamesters, CEGs.
An Alternative to Caveat Emptor Gamesterism
as a Foundation for Business
Fortunately, there already exists a foundation as prosocial
for corporate business as health is for medicine and jus-
tice is for law. It goes back at least as far as Plato, and
trustworthy business people today already espouse it.
Contemporary language for this prosocial foundation is
offered by Harvard Business School Professor Rakesh
Khurana when he recommends that MBA students be
educated to be ‘‘stewards of society’s economic resour-
ces.’’ (Khurana 2011) This goal of stewardship of soci-
ety’s economic resources will be clearer if we look at a
pair of older expressions of it, beginning with a 1931 Yale
Law Review article contrasting it explicitly to caveat
emptor.
William Hamilton, a Professor of Law at Yale who
assisted President Franklin Roosevelt in developing the
New Deal, became concerned about the fate of consumers
as burgeoning industrial technology generated more and
more products whose quality could not be competently
assessed by lay consumers, forcing consumers to place
increased trust in manufacturers and sellers. In his 1931
article ‘‘The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor,’’ Hamilton
looked into the history of the phrase ‘‘caveat emptor’’ and
reported that despite its being in Latin and despite ancient
Rome’s abundance of legal debate, he was unable to find
any record of the phrase among the Romans or in Europe
before the later Middle Ages. He noted that after the fall of
Rome, trade gradually reemerged in Europe with the rise of
traveling fairs and then of permanent market towns and
eventually of cities, but that despite this evolution, it
continued to be true that, in thirteenth-century language
Hamilton cites from Thomas Aquinas, ‘‘rightful trade…
served public necessity.’’ (Hamilton 1931, p. 1137, draw-
ing on Summa Theologica II.II. Q.LXXVII.Art. IV)
Hamilton writes that duping buyers was considered as
injurious to the public order as other infractions such as
assault or theft. Indeed,
the records attest the dominance of the idea of soli-
darity. The welfare of the collect is always given first
position…. The devices in which greatest reliance
was put were publicity and prevention. The deceitful
maker and the dishonest vendor were paraded
through the streets with their fraudulent wares,
exposed in the stocks with their false products burned
beneath their feet…. In the prevailing legal theory it
was not so much the buyer who was injured as the
commune. [p. 1152–1153]
Hamilton thinks that as towns arose, the phrase caveat
emptor may have come into use to warn people not to get
drawn into what we today call the ‘‘black market.’’ He
writes that in back streets,
away from the marts of organized trade were to be
found the wayfaring palmer with his relics and trin-
kets, the peripatetic peddler with gew-gaws and
ornaments, strangers here today and there tomorrow,
wayfaring men of no place and without the law.
[p. 1162]
In sum, Hamilton concludes that up through the Middle
Ages the dominant view was that in commercial abuses ‘‘it
was not so much the buyer who was injured as the
commune’’ and that ‘‘the sense of the age, concerned to
secure the common profit, had no reputable place for a
notion of caveat emptor.’’ [p. 1156]
The view of medieval commerce reported by Hamilton
accords with the view that Plato has Socrates express in
Book Two of the Republic when Socrates describes what
he calls the ‘‘healthy city.’’ [Plato Republic II. 369d–372e]
The healthy city is very different from the ‘‘fevered’’ or
‘‘luxurious’’ city discussed in the remainder of the
Republic, with its philosopher kings and queens as absolute
rulers and its army to defend and extend its luxuries.12 In
characterizing the ‘‘healthy’’ city, Socrates says that its
people will contribute in a variety of ways because ‘‘each
of us is born somewhat different from the others, one more
apt for one task, one for another.’’ Therefore the healthy
city will include specialists in various occupations such as
farming, carpentry, metalwork, and provision of the mar-
kets needed for distributing the products of the various
crafts. The farmer will want to sell grain in order to buy
shoes, and the cobbler will want to sell shoes in order to
buy grain. So that the cobbler does not have to sit around
all day waiting for a farmer to show up and vice versa, the
merchant will make a market that is available when nee-
ded. The existence of a market will also facilitate multi-
party chains of exchange, as when the cobbler wants
platters and the platter maker wants grain and the farmer
wants a new roof and so on. Just as the contribution of the
farmer requires expertise about when to sow and when to
reap, the merchants’ contribution requires expertise about
such things as how much grain and how many pairs of
12 This ‘‘fevered’’ city discussed in the later books of the Republic
has regularly but mistakenly been presented as what Socrates is
advocating, despite the fact that Socrates states explicitly that
‘‘…to me the true city is that which we described, like a
healthy individual. However, if you wish, let us also observe
the feverish city. ’’ [II.372e]
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sandals to keep in stock. Like the farmers and the cobblers,
the merchants should be able to earn their living by their
work in their specialty, but exploitation or profiteering by
merchants would be regarded as being just as much a harm
to the whole community as it would be for farmers to
destroy the land by overplanting for quick profit without
regard to damage to the soil.
Society had, of course, become vastly more complex by
the time Khurana published his 2007 history of U.S.
business education, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands.13
However, Khurana shows that business education as part of
the university began in the U.S. in the late nineteenth
century with the intention of producing graduates who
would play essentially the same role described by Plato and
Hamilton, namely serving as what Khurana calls ‘‘stewards
of society’s economic resources.’’
Khurana begins his history of business education in the
universities by noting the emergence of a major new
occupation, namely management, during and following the
Civil War as companies, primarily in the North, grew
enormously in size and scope. The telegraph, typewriter,
telephone and railroads brought a major leap in the possible
size and speed of business, a leap as huge for the nineteenth
century as electronic communication has been for today. In
this context, there were those who hoped the new managers
would defuse the tensions between owners and the other
major new group produced by industrialization, the urban
wage laborers, who were flocking to industrial cities from
U.S. farms and from Europe.
To become technically competent, managers would need
to learn how to arrange assembly lines, order raw materials,
ship products, staff offices, keep records, etc. These tech-
nical needs make it unsurprising that the earliest managers
emerged from among the engineers who built the factories
and railroads and participated in the great expansions in
communications that made huge operations possible.
Technological developments, however, cannot eliminate
questions of social goals and values. Khurana reports that
university-based higher education for managers, which
began with the Wharton School in 1881, arose from
the efforts of a vanguard of institutional entrepreneurs,
both academics and managers, who saw the need for
creating a managerial class that would run America’s
large corporations in a way that served the broader
interests of society rather than the narrowly defined
ones of capital and labor. [4, bold italics added]
Khurana reports that this vanguard intended the university
business school to produce ‘‘professionals’’ comparable to
the products of medical and legal education. Khurana
reviews the extensive literature on how ‘‘profession’’ should
be defined, and he decides upon the definition offered by
Everett C. Hughes, a scholar of the modern occupa-
tional structure, who described the status of profes-
sions in American society as the result of a type of
social compact: professions are given extraordinary
privilege in exchange for their contributions to the
enhancement of social order.’’14
The ‘‘privilege’’ granted to business—the counterpart of
the monopoly on medical and legal practice granted to
licensed doctors and lawyers—was the corporate form,
with its ability to amass more capital than a single
individual generally could and its privilege of ‘‘limited
liability,’’ the protection of individual investors from loss
of any money beyond what they had invested in the firm.
Using the word ‘‘profession’’ in this prosocial way that
links it to professions such as medicine and law, Khurana
states the project of his book as follows:
The history of the university-based business school is
thus framed in these pages as a professionalization
project undertaken, transformed, and finally aban-
doned over a period stretching from the founding of
the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania
in 1881 up to the present. [7]
We will look at Khurana’s account of the abandonment of
this project as we consider how today’s trustworthy people
of business could revive it.
An Agenda for Marginalizing Caveat emptor
Gamesterism: Reorienting MBA Education
and Establishing Licensing for High Level Executives
Society needs MBA programs to do what the MD and JD
and other professional certifications are meant to do,
namely train skilled, prosocial, responsible practitioners
while being uncongenial to or too difficult for incipient
charlatans or—in the case of corporate business—incipient
caveat emptor gamesters, CEGs. The corporate structure
has become too powerful for our trustworthy people of
business to allow it to continue to be so often exploited by
CEGs for their own excitement and personal wealth.
If enough faculty and supporters of MBA programs will
decide to renew the nineteenth-century ‘‘professionalization
13 Khurana’s book has received multiple awards, including the 2007
Association of American Publishers Award for Best Professional/
Scholarly Publishing Book in Business, Finance and Management,
and the 2008 American Sociological Association’s Max Weber Best
Book Award.
14 P. 11, with footnote to Everett C. Hughes. ‘‘Professions.’’ In The




project’’ and reorient the MBA toward stewardship, there
would surely be enough insight, influence and skill among
them to develop a course of study that would attract and
prepare potential stewards while simultaneously deflecting
potential CEGs. Reorienting the MBA would not require
any action by national or state governments or by currently
dominant business organizations such as the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce. It is something the trustworthy practitioners
and teachers of business could bring about simply by
working together with the best MBA programs, i.e., the
programs most interested in graduating stewards and
therefore most interested in implementing a demanding
course of study designed to attract potential stewards and
deflect potential CEGs.
As trustworthy teachers and practitioners of business
consider elements for a reoriented MBA course of study,
two things that I have found in my own undergraduate
business course to be effective in differentiating potential
stewards from potential CEGs are substantial study of
corporate history and substantial experience as an intern or
employee in an organization that does not have profit
maximization as a primary goal.
The value of internships is already widely recognized
today in business education as in other disciplines, but to
help MBA programs be attractive to potential stewards and
unattractive to potential CEGs, internships need to be with
prosocial organizations. Setting up prosocial internships
would be greatly aided by the fact that today’s ‘‘social
entrepreneurs’’ have created a growing number of prosocial
for-profit companies that already model the goal of stew-
ardship, as do many prosocial non-profit organizations.
While the value of internships is recognized in MBA
programs, the value of the study of history is not. This
neglect is damaging, because well-taught history involves
entering into the thinking and values of people of different
times and circumstances in order to be able to reflect on
one’s own thinking and values. Students low in empathy
and reflectiveness and strongly oriented toward games are
likely to find historical study difficult and unrewarding,
since history cannot be deeply understood by ‘‘game-
think’’ any more than by simply memorizing dates.
Potential stewards, on the other hand, tend to find historical
study illuminating and worthwhile.
History courses are particularly likely to be unattractive to
students who accept the view that companies should focus on
moving with speed in order to leave their competitors in the
dust, even if that means distributing something whose safety
has not been fully researched. Such students are at risk of
agreeing with Jack Welch that executives should ‘‘ponder
less and do more.’’ Welch writes that
strategy is a living, breathing, totally dynamic game.
It’s fun—and fast. And it’s alive. Forget the scenario
planning, year long studies, and hundred-plus-page
reports. They’re time-consuming and expensive, and
you just don’t need them…. If you want to win…
ponder less and do more. (Welch 2005, p. 166)
The title of one airport book proclaims it’s Not the BIG that
eat the SMALL; it’s the FAST that eat the SLOW. The
authors write that the only difference between ‘‘speed’’ and
‘‘haste’’ is that ‘‘speed’’ has ‘‘a destination in mind.’’
(Jennings and Haughton 2000, p. 9)
Prosocial internships and strong history courses could
help screen potential CEGs out of MBA programs without
taking on the problems of ‘‘character tests.’’ Instead, the
history and prosocial internship requirements would con-
tribute to screening in the way that the need for rhythm in
musical studies attracts some students and screens out
others. Similarly, some medical schools are developing
what has been called ‘‘a people skills test’’ to help screen
out candidates who are unlikely to be sufficiently attuned to
patients (Harris 2011).15 I have seen many college students
drop plans for applying to law school or medical school
when they find that they do not want to do or cannot do the
type or level of work required.
Two historical topics that have appeared to me to dif-
ferentiate potential CEGs from potential stewards among
my own students are history of the corporate form in the
U.S. from colonial times to the present and history of the
MBA itself. Here is a sampling of materials that I have
found effective for each, followed by additional recom-
mendation of the licensing which is needed in addition to
upgrading of the MBA curriculum.
History of the Corporate Form in the U.S.
An eye-opening beginning for the history of the corporate
form in the U.S. has been pointing out that the reason
corporations are not mentioned in the Constitution is not
that they were unimportant but that this topic, like slavery,
was too hot to handle and would have made it impossible
for the 1787 Constitutional Convention to reach consensus.
Because disagreement about corporations was so intense,
the issue of corporations, like the issue of slavery, was left
to the individual states.
What made the issue of corporations so fraught was
memory of the favoritism shown by monarchs of Europe in
granting the lucrative charters of incorporation. Favoritism
was in turn exhibited by colonial governments, resulting,
among other things, in a problematic proliferation of
15 Harris writes that ‘‘Doctors save lives, but they can sometimes be
insufferable know-it-alls who bully nurses and do not listen to
patients. Medical schools have traditionally done little to screen out
such flawed applicants or to train them to behave better, but that is
changing.’’
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lucrative private banks and insurance companies. John
Sloss Hobart, who in the 18th century was a prominent high
court justice in the state of New York, wrote that ‘‘All
incorporations imply a privilege given to one order of
citizens which others do not enjoy, and are so far
destructive of that principle of equal liberty which should
subsist in every community.’’16
This debate about corporations was a part of wider
debates about what sort of country people wanted the new
United States to become. For example, Alexander Hamil-
ton and others in favor of establishing a national bank
wanted the U.S. to focus on becoming an international
mercantile power, while Thomas Jefferson and others
advocated a nation of independent yeoman farmers and
artisans.
One of many expressions of popular concern about
corporations was an 1801 protest by independent artisans
against an effort by ‘‘several of New York City’s wealthy
merchants to form a joint-stock company that was capable
of supplying enough bread for the entire city and that
offered to hire the previously independent bakers.’’17 The
protest included artisans from many crafts who came
together to resist what they saw as a movement to
‘‘monopolize by degrees all profitable mechanical bran-
ches.’’ The artisans ‘‘feared that once the ‘monopolies’ had
reduced most artisans to wage laborers, they could then use
their power to reduce wages so that ‘the independent spirit,
so distinguished at present in our mechanics, and so useful
in republics, will be entirely annihilated.’’’
The historian Gordon S. Wood has written that in the
new United States,
Once the old [colonial] hierarchies disintegrated…,
the new states’ attempts to grant such corporate
privileges to select individuals and groups immedi-
ately raised storms of protest. When in the Philadel-
phia [Constitutional] Convention James Madison
proposed that the federal government be given the
explicit power to grant charters of incorporation, the
framers decided to finesse the issue by saying nothing
in the Constitution about incorporations out of fear of
arousing popular opposition to ‘mercantile monopo-
lies.’…. Such franchises and privileged grants may
have made sense in monarchies…. [b]ut now that
only the people ruled, these grants of corporate
privileges seemed pernicious…. [Wood 1992,
pp. 319–320]
Judge Spencer Roane of the Virginia Supreme Court ruled
as follows in 1809 in Currie’s Administrator vs. Mutual
Assurance Society:
With respect to acts of incorporation, they ought
never to be passed, but in consideration of services to
be rendered to the public…. It may be often conve-
nient for a set of associated individuals, to have the
privileges of a corporation bestowed upon them; but
if their object is merely private or selfish; if it is
detrimental to, or not promotive of, the public good,
they have no adequate claim upon the legislature for
the privilege.’’ (Roane 1809)
Despite popular opposition, however, those interested in
expanding the powers of corporations for purposes of
‘‘private’’ gain continued their efforts. Through the courts
and legislatures, they sought powers beyond those granted
to corporations in the early U.S. to enable the pooling of
capital needed for large projects for the public such as
building a road, powers such as the ability of the corpo-
ration itself to be a party to a contract in the way individual
people could (‘‘corporate personhood’’) and ‘‘limited lia-
bility,’’ the protection of investors from liability beyond the
sum each had invested. Those interested in greater powers
for corporations to make them better vehicles for private
gain began to seek, for example, what was called ‘‘general’’
incorporation, as contrasted to the ‘‘special’’ incorporation
to which profit-making corporations were limited. ‘‘Spe-
cial’’ incorporation required a specification of a particular
project and approval by a special act of a state legislature.
‘‘General’’ incorporation, by contrast, was granted to
schools and churches without limiting them to a specific
project, the goal being to protect their freedoms of religion
and speech. Those in favor of allowing expanded powers to
for-profit companies went to work, and through courts and
legislatures, and thus out of the view of the large portion of
the population that does not closely follow activities in
those arenas, succeeded in obtaining the privilege of gen-
eral incorporation. Similarly, forces supporting for-profit
corporations brought about such things as the dropping of
restrictions on the magnitude of profits. Khurana summa-
rizes these developments as follows:
An increased rate of incorporations under ‘general law’
as opposed to ‘special acts’ of the legislature was the
result of a series of Supreme Court rulings (beginning
with its landmark decision in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward in 1819 that found that corporations of all
sorts possessed rights as private entities, so that state
legislatures could not easily revoke their charters). As a
result, legislatures began to loosen their restrictions on
what corporations could do. For example, in 1830, the
Massachusetts legislature eliminated the requirement
16 Quoted in Hartog (1983).
17 ‘‘Note: Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Antebel-
lum Political Culture.’’ Harvard Law Review, June, 1989. Such notes




that a corporation be engaged in public works [in order]
to be given the status of limited liability. Connecticut
did the same in 1837. By 1850, many states were
competing with one another to define corporate rights
as broadly as possible, with New Jersey and Ohio
(where Standard Oil exerted significant influence)
offering some of the most liberal terms. (Khurrana
2007, p. 407)
As for-profit corporations accumulated greater powers
and protections, concern about them also continued to
grow. Abraham Lincoln, reflecting on the hugely acceler-
ated industrialization of the North during the Civil War,
wrote to Col. William F.Elkins in 1864 as follows:
We may congratulate ourselves that this cruel war is
nearing its end…. but I see in the near future a crisis
approaching that unnerves me and causes me to
tremble for the safety of my country. As a result of
the war, corporations have been enthroned and an era
of corruption in high places will follow, and the
money power of the country will endeavor to prolong
its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people
until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the
Republic is destroyed. I feel at this moment more
anxious for the safety of my country than ever before,
even in the midst of war. (Lincoln 1864, p. 40)
Henry Adams wrote in 1870 in Britain’s Westminster
Review that
The belief is common in America that the day is at
hand when corporations… after having created a
system of quiet but irresistible corruption, will ulti-
mately succeed in directing government itself. Under
the American form of society, there is now no
authority capable of effective resistance…. Nor is this
danger confined to America alone. The corporation is
in its nature a threat against the popular institutions
which are spreading so rapidly over the whole
world,… and unless some satisfactory solution of the
problem can be reached, popular institutions may yet
find their very existence endangered. (Adams 1870)
The U.S. Supreme Court in 1886, in the 14th Amend-
ment case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad, opened the way for a major extension of the
privileges of corporations beyond being legal ‘‘persons’’
only in the sense of being entities capable of being a party
to a contract or law suit. The 14th Amendment to the
Constitution, the amendment promising ‘‘equal protection’’
of the laws, had been adopted just after the Civil War to
guarantee the rights of the newly freed slaves, including the
rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. The pro-cor-
poration clerk drafting the Santa Clara opinion included
corporations in the preface to the opinion in a way that
expanded the understanding of corporations as ‘‘persons’’
to include them under the protections of the 14th Amend-
ment along with the newly freed slaves. Pro-corporation
groups quickly brought other suits citing Santa Clara as a
precedent to lock in this expansion.18
Santa Clara’s bringing of corporations within the pro-
tections of the 14th Amendment, and thus of the Bill of
Rights, by piggy-backing on the newly freed slaves has
received renewed attention recently in relation to the most
recent dramatic expansion of corporate power, the 2010
Citizens United ruling by the Roberts Supreme Court. (Cit-
izens United 2010) the ruling empowers for-profit corpora-
tions to do such things as spend unlimited amounts of money
in support of candidates during an election on the grounds
that corporations as ‘‘persons’’ are entitled to free speech
under the Bill of Rights. In the 2012 Presidential election, the
first in which corporations could spend unlimited sums, the
Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, casually sliding from
‘‘persons’’ to ‘‘people,’’ stated that ‘‘corporations are peo-
ple.’’ One response to this was ‘‘I’ll believe corporations are
people when they hang one in Texas.’’
In the Progressive Era of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, the expansion of the legal powers and
protections accumulated by for-profit corporations was
reflected in a division within the business community that
was already present at the Constitutional Convention and
continues still today. Some in the business community-
seized opportunities such as the Santa Clara case to expand
the powers of the corporate form as a vehicle for increased
personal power and wealth. Contrasting to this were what
we have seen Khurana describe as
the efforts of a vanguard of institutional entrepre-
neurs, both academics and managers, who saw the
need for creating a managerial class that would run
America’s large corporations in a way that served the
broader interests of society rather than the narrowly
defined ones of capital and labor. [4, bold italics
added].
A reflection of this division was that in the Progressive
period in which medicine and law not only upgraded pro-
fessional education but also established licensing to make
individual practitioners more accountable, business estab-
lished professional education but not licensing. Instead,
continuing aggrandizements of the corporate form made it
easier for individual executives as well as the corporate
entity to avoid public accountability.
Between Santa Clara and Citizens United, ongoing
concern about corporations is illustrated by such things as
18 For an excellent discussion of the Santa Clara case, see Horwitz
(1985).
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the famous warning issued by Republican President
Dwight Eisenhower in 1961 on his last day in office:
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial com-
plex.. [carries]… the potential for the disastrous rise
of misplaced power…. We must never let the weight
of this combination endanger our liberties or demo-
cratic processes. (Eisenhower 1961. For additional
comments on corporations by U.S. Presidents, see
Beets 2011)
MBA students who had studied the evolution of the
corporate form would be in a position to discuss whether
there are ways to hold today’s for-profit corporations to the
prosocial role required of corporations at the beginning of
U.S. history.
History of the MBA
The history of the MBA itself could be an organizing
theme for a course looking at several topics society needs
its corporate executives to be thoughtful about, such as
mathematical modeling. Khurana’s book From Higher
Aims to Hired Hands could serve as a splendid course
text.19 Like other good histories, Khurana’s illuminates its
topic by placing it in relationship to broader social trends,
and at the same time, the book identifies significant actions
taken by individual persons in particular circumstances.
Recounting individual actions is an important part of what
makes history illuminating, whereas individual actions are
generally invisible to mathematical models. Discussion of
such actions can encourage students to ask themselves
about their own relationship to action. In addition, the
project of working through Khurana’s meticulously
researched and reasoned book would help students who are
potential stewards recognize the shallowness of texts such
as ‘‘airport’’ books. At the same time, students who are
potential CEGs are likely to find Khurana’s text too diffi-
cult and/or frustrating, and that could help encourage them
to drop the idea of pursuing an MBA.
Of the broader social trends noted in Khurana’s book,
three that would be especially worthwhile for today’s MBA
students to look at are the Progressive movement of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the ‘‘management
science’’ produced by the Second World War, and what can
be referred to as ‘‘mathematicism.’’
In connection with Progressivism, students could look at
seeds of it in the 1865 creation of the American
Association for the Promotion of Social Science, which
developed into the American Social Science Association
(ASSA). The Association was created for the purpose of
developing knowledge about society not simply to expand
knowledge for its own sake but also to find ways to deal
with the new and growing problems of industrialization
and urbanization. These problems included pollution and
sanitation issues and the plight of the new urban wage
laborers that led workers to organize such groups as the
Knights of Labor, formed in 1869. All of these are splendid
topics for student papers or discussion groups.
Looking at Progressivism could also include a compar-
ison of the professionalizing goals of the prosocial founders
of business education with those of other prosocial groups
in addition to medicine and law. For example, social work,
which began as a profession in this same period, has
retained its progressive ideals, with the result that it has
today a professional code that would be very worth dis-
cussion by MBA students. The code is summarized in its
own ‘‘Preamble’’ as follows, with elaborations of each of
the six ‘‘core values’’ that are simply listed here:20
The mission of the social work profession is rooted in
a set of core values…. embraced by social workers
throughout the profession’s history….:
Service
Social Justice
Dignity and worth of the person
Importance of human relationships
Integrity
Competence
The code of a more recently founded prosocial organi-
zation of professionals, the National Network of Public
Health Institutes, founded in 2001, includes the following
in its Preamble:
Public health is understood within these principles as
what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the
conditions for people to be healthy.
We affirm the World Health Organization’s under-
standing of health as a state of complete physical,
mental, and social well-being, and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity….
A key belief worth highlighting, and which underlies
several of the Ethical Principles, is the interdepen-
dence of people. This interdependence is the essence
of community. Public health not only seeks to assure
the health of whole communities but also recognizes
19 Khurana’s valuable text is being noticed in other discussions of
business education reform as well, see, for example, the 2010 issue on
business education published by the British Journal of Management
(Vol. 21, S1–S5].
20 The full code of the National Association of Social Workers is
available in Spanish and English at http://www.socialworkers.
org/pubs/code/default.asp retrieved July 2 2012
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that the health of individuals is tied to their life in the
community.21
A code can be valuable if simply for the extensive
deliberation required to formulate it. Once formulated, a
code can be a valuable instrument for helping a field’s
prosocial practitioners remember the goals of their pro-
fession or recognize needed changes. The code should
therefore be examined closely in the education preparing
for entrance to the profession, and a licensing exam should
include questions designed to show that the candidate
understands and can articulate it. A code can be valuable in
these ways without taking on the drawbacks of a signed
oath, which CEGs could sign, even sign ostentatiously,
without feeling actually bound by it, making the oath
useless in shaping their behavior and discouraging to those
who sign in good faith and see the oath’s inability to curb
CEGs.
Moving from the Progressive Era to World War II,
MBA students could discuss Khurana’s point that ‘‘because
the war was being fought between the advanced industrial
powers, it was in part a contest of organizational and
managerial skill’’ [199]. He says in this connection that the
war accustomed Americans to ‘‘features of a large-scale
bureaucracy, with its defined authority structures, admin-
istrative rules, and predictable career paths’’ [200]. After
the war, there was a continuation of ‘‘trends in manage-
ment set in motion by the organizational demands of World
War II’’ [206].
Khurana shows that the victory of the U.S. in the war’s
‘‘contest of organizational and managerial skill’’ (including
the emergence of the digital computer) shaped post-war
thinking about ‘‘civilian’’ management. Just as the Civil
War’s new industrial-strength management, made possible
by the typewriter-telephone-telegraph-railroad communi-
cations leaps, had led to a ‘‘belief that enlightened
administration of large organizations, public and private,
held the key to establishing a new social order on a sci-
entific and rational footing’’ [43], so World War II pro-
duced a belief in the possibility of a ‘‘redefinition of
business school curriculum and research on a rigorous,
scientific basis as the primary mechanism through which a
profession of management could be created’’ [271].
This post-World War II view that Khurana calls
‘‘managerialism’’ or ‘‘scientific management’’ rested on an
idea that
there now finally existed [because of World War II] a
‘management science’ that could be taught….[T]he
decision-making tools developed during the war,
such as decision analysis and game theory, combined
with the theoretical insights from the behavioral sci-
ences, constituted the basic elements of this new
management science…. [which] could best be taught
to students… through a rigorous immersion in
quantitative analysis and concepts from decision
theory. [271, bold italics added]
Just as it was railroad engineers who pioneered the
emergence of ‘‘management’’ as part of industrialization
after the Civil War, so the dramatic upsurge of digital
computing in and after World War II produced the belief
that ‘‘there now finally existed’’ a ‘‘management science,’’
inspiring, among other things, today’s ‘‘quants’’ in eco-
nomics, a number of whom started off as physicists.
Studying this idea of a ‘‘management science… best
taught…through quantitative analysis’’ would offer an
opportunity for business students to consider a third and
especially deep-rooted Western social trend, namely what we
may call ‘‘mathematicism’’ in general. In the Western intel-
lectual tradition there are recurring moments in which an
advance in mathematics or logic has produced in some
enthusiasts a belief that ‘‘there now finally existed’’ some
formal tool that would enable humankind to bring all
important knowledge together into one formal system. The
Pythagoreans of Ancient Greece were thrilled by impressive
discoveries such as the possibilities of modeling music geo-
metrically—e.g., a string double the length of another string
sounds an octave lower. They concluded that ‘‘there now
finally existed’’ a universal key to knowledge and famously
announced that ‘‘all is number.’’ Galileo, thrilled by new
advances such as the geometry of the lenses he used in his
telescopes, wrote that ‘‘this grand book… the universe…
stands continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be under-
stood unless one first learns… the language in which it is
written…. the language of mathematics (Galileo 1623).
Leibniz, who independently invented the calculus at the same
time as Newton, was inspired by his invention to a belief that it
would eventually be possible to devise (although he never
devised it) a system of notation to be called the ‘‘universal
characteristic’’ that would allow even ethics to be mathema-
ticized, so that instead of arguing in ethics, we would say like
the physicists, ‘‘Come, let us calculate’’ (Leibniz 1685). A few
decades later enthusiasm for the calculus combined with the
development of statistics to inspire a belief that ‘‘there now
finally existed’’ methods of mathematical modeling that could
do for society what Newton’s physics had done for the
material world. This belief led to what first the French phi-
losopher August Comte and then the Belgian statistician
Adolphe Quetelet called ‘‘social physics,’’ ancestor of such
studies as today’s ‘‘econometrics.’’ (Quetelet 1835)
It is important for MBA students to understand that
throughout history mathematicist rounds of ‘‘there now
finally existed’’ have repeatedly shown their inherent
21 The full Code is available at http://nnphi.org/uploads/media_
items/ph-code-of-ethics-booklet.original.pdf Accessed June 26, 2012.
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limits. These limits are even deeper than straightforward
blunders, even though blunders can do enormous damage.
An example is the damage done to so many in the 2008
collapse because bond rating agencies failed to include in
their models the possibility that housing prices might go
down instead of always up, the possibility that there might
be negative numbers their model did not take into account.
At least three sorts of limitation deeper than blunders are
particularly important for business students to consider.
One is that formal systems of mathematics and logic are
‘‘value neutral.’’ That is, individual people who happen to
be mathematicians or logicians, whether in economics or
any ‘‘science,’’ may, like everyone else, have opinions
about questions of value, but these opinions cannot be
derived from their formal model unless they are already
present in the starting assumptions or premises. Business
students need to reflect on this in order to be aware of value
assumptions they may be making, so that they can ask
themselves about the sources of their value assumptions or
premises and on what grounds they might recommend
them to others, since a system does not prove its own
assumptions.
One accessible and historically important place to begin
discussion of this value neutrality would be examination of
the ‘‘is/ought’’ distinction made in the late eighteenth cen-
tury by David Hume, one of the major early modern phi-
losophers who worked to revise Western philosophy to fit the
‘‘Scientific Revolution’’ epitomized by Newton’s mathe-
matical physics. [Hume 1739 Bk. III, Part I, Sect. I] Hume’s
way of putting what is sometimes called the ‘‘fact-value
distinction’’ was that ‘‘ought’’ statements cannot be deduced
from ‘‘is’’ statements, and that the combination of direct
observation and formal manipulation that constitutes natural
science, what Hume called ‘‘reason,’’ makes only ‘‘is’’
statements, not ‘‘ought’’ statements, or in other terms, makes
only ‘‘descriptive’’ statements and not ‘‘normative’’ or
‘‘prescriptive’’ statements. Apart from the statements of
natural science or ‘‘reason,’’ all the rest of what Hume called
‘‘actions of the mind,’’ including ethics and aesthetics, were
said by him to come under not ‘‘reason’’ but ‘‘sentiment,’’ an
important eighteenth century concept vastly richer and more
complex than the ‘‘emotion’’ to which Logical Positivists
such as A. J. Ayer reduced it in their early twentieth-century
neo-Humeanism, a reduction that itself can be another
splendid paper topic for students. [Ayer 1936/46]
Hume’s is/ought distinction can be illustrated by com-
paring the statement that ‘‘tobacco companies increase
sales by advertising,’’ an ‘‘is’’ statement shown by mar-
keting research to be true, with the profoundly different
statement that ‘‘tobacco companies ought to increase sales
by marketing.’’ There is continuing vigorous debate about
the ‘‘fact/value’’ distinction, and MBA students would
benefit from looking at that discussion.
A different sort of example of the inability of formal
systems to generate value statements is offered by today’s
very appropriate excitement among scientists and science
fans about evidence that the giant Hadron Collider has
found the hypothesized sub-atomic particle called the Hi-
ggs Boson, long sought by physicists and astronomers. If it
has been discovered, however, and if it eventually turns
out, as basic science so often does, to have possibilities for
practical applications, the discovery itself will not tell us
what we ‘‘ought’’ to do about those possibilities, just as the
discovery of how to split the atom did not tell us whether or
not to make a bomb, or whether or not to drop our bomb
once we had made it.
In addition to value neutrality, a second recurring issue
in working with formal systems is how to deal with situ-
ations in which the formal model and the world do not
match. One type of response can be called the ‘‘Procrustean
bed’’ response, after the ancient king Procustus, who was
said to deal with the quandary of a guest too tall for the bed
by chopping down the guest’s legs to fit. A historical
example of requiring the world to fit one’s theory rather
than the other way around is Kepler’s acceptance of the
ancient assumption that the planetary orbits must be cir-
cular, an assumption which delayed for many years Kep-
ler’s realization that the orbits are actually elliptical.
An example from economics of mismatch between a
formal theory and the world has been the problem of
finding assumptions about humans that are both convenient
for economic theories and actually true of humans. For this,
business students could read the essay ‘‘Rational Fools’’ by
the philosopher and Nobel Prize winning economist Sen
(1977). Sen’s essay begins with discussion of F. Y. Edge-
worth’s (1881) book, Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on
the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences:
Edgeworth asserted that ‘‘the first principle of Eco-
nomics is that every agent is actuated only by self-
interest.’’ This view of man has been a persistent one
in economic models…. In this essay I would like to
examine some of the problems that have arisen from
this conception of human beings. I should mention
that Edgeworth himself was quite aware that this so-
called first principle of Economics was not a partic-
ularly realistic one. Indeed, he felt that ‘‘the concrete
nineteenth century man is for the most part an impure
egoist, a mixed utilitarian.’’ This raises the interesting
question as to why Edgeworth spent so much of his
time and talent in developing a line of inquiry the first
principle of which he believed to be false.
Another possible response when a model fails to fit the
world is just to leave out the inconvenient aspects of the
world. Economists call these omitted aspects ‘‘externali-
ties,’’ and the omission can happen either consciously or
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unconsciously. A major contribution by feminist econo-
mists in the 1980s in the ‘‘Second Wave’’ of the women’s
movement was to point out that neither ‘‘mainstream’’
neoclassical economic theory nor Marxian economic
theory included a place for unpaid domestic labor, with
the result that the huge portion of the world’s work that is
done in the home—and still primarily by women—was
treated as being of no economic significance. Some
economists tried to repair this embarrassing omission by
seeking ways to quantify domestic labor in order to add it
while leaving their basic model intact. But others, such as
economist Julie Matthaei, are addressing the deeper
gender assumptions reflected in currently dominant mod-
els. For example, the model known as ‘‘the sexual
division of labor’’ has tended to involve an assumption
that the ‘‘public’’ sphere of paid labor will be made up
mostly of men, with women in the ‘‘private’’ sphere of
unpaid labor. Economists such as Matthaei have begun
developing models with more adequate approaches to
gender, and business students could gain a greater
understanding of modeling as well as of gender by
looking at these more imaginative approaches (Matthaei
2001).
Sometimes an aspect of the world is consciously treated
as an economic externality because the makers of a model
find that aspect disadvantageous to include. For example,
Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson report as follows the
objections of economist Joseph Stiglitz to treating envi-
ronmental degradation as an externality:
[Stiglitz believes that] ‘‘our economy is being over-
whelmed by politically engineered market advanta-
ges…. By this he [Stiglitz] means economic returns
above normal market levels that are derived from
favorable political treatment…. [This favorable
treatment includes classifying some things as] ‘neg-
ative externalities, or costs that economic producers
impose on society for which they don’t pay. The
spectacular profits of the energy industry, for exam-
ple, rely heavily on the failure of regulation to
incorporate fully the social and economic costs
associated with environmental degradation, including
climate change (Hacker and Pierson 2012).
Finally, an experience of working with formal theories
that has repeatedly frustrated enthusiasts of mathematicism
is having the theory tie itself into a knot. Thus the ancient
Greeks, despite their splendid achievements in geometry
and logic, were left with ‘‘Zeno’s Paradoxes.’’ These
included the ‘‘proof’’ that the tortoise could beat Achilles in
a footrace if the tortoise were given a head start, however
small, and kept moving. After all, Achilles would first have
to run to where the tortoise started, but by the time he got
there, the tortoise would have moved farther on… and on
and on, until the tortoise crosses the finish line with
Achilles ever closer but always still behind.
The failures of theories have continually inspired theory
makers to try again, and that is fine and interesting and
potentially fruitful, as long as there is no speedy (‘‘it is the
FAST that Eat the SLOW’’), or distorted or self-serving
application that injures people or the environment.
Bringing together consideration of mathematicism and
of the dream of ‘‘management science’’ after World War II,
Khurana provides the following capsule history of how the
dream crashed in the Vietnam war:
By the late 1960s there was growing doubt about the
claims and usefulness of management science. As
Steven Sass notes…: ‘Errors in modeling, measure-
ment, or computation had led to serious blunders, and
in some cases the results were unequivocally disas-
trous.’ The mounting casualties in Vietnam, com-
bined with the hubris shown by former Ford Motor
Company Whiz Kid and Harvard Business School
accounting professor Robert McNamara, eventually
offered a ‘nagging public symbol’ of management
science’s human cost and seemed to indict the notion
that cold, rational calculus was productive of good
judgment. [286]
A business class discussing this topic could watch Errol
Morris’s 2003 documentary about McNamara, The Fog of
War, and discuss McNamara’s chastened conclusion that
war ‘‘is so complex it’s beyond the ability of the human
mind to comprehend all the variables.’’ (Morris’s 2003,
p.18 of a 19 page printout) Trying ‘‘to comprehend all the
variables’’ in McNamara’s mathmaticist sense is the
approach of a computer programmer, not of a historian
or poet. But the evidently well intentioned McNamara
seems to have had only mathematicist thinking to draw
upon. At this point it would be important for business
students to discuss what ways of thinking and approaches
to planning and decision making they conclude might be
needed when computer modeling and other forms of
mathematicism prove inadequate or misleading.
After tracing the emergence and decline of ‘‘manage-
ment science’’ as a foundation for business education,
Khurana moves on to discuss its worrisome successor,
which he refers to as ‘‘the ‘leadership’ nostrum’’ [352],
‘‘nostrum’’ being defined by the Oxford English Dictionary
as ‘‘a quack remedy or patent medicine.’’ ‘‘Leadership
studies’’ is characterized by Khurana as another episode in
a problematic strand present in the business education
movement since its beginning. That strand has been the
desire of some to appropriate the prestige of being part of a
university without demanding the combination of complex
thinking and commitment to social benefit that is essential
to marginalizing charlatans in any profession. An attempt
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to appropriate the university in this way is, of course, fully
compatible with caveat emptor gamesterism.
Khurana reports that ‘‘academic concern with the sub-
ject of leadership began [in the social sciences] in 1945,’’
but he concludes in his 2007 book that
Leadership as a body of knowledge, after decades of
scholarly attention… remains without either a widely
accepted theoretical framework or a cumulative
empirical understanding leading to a usable body of
knowledge. Moreover, the probability that leadership
studies will make significant strides in developing a
fundamental knowledge base is fairly low. The reality
is that inside universities and research-based business
schools, leadership research has relatively low status.
In elite business schools, for example, there are no
‘leadership’ departments…. Within the Academy of
Management, the largest professional association for
business school scholars, leadership is not even rec-
ognized as a distinct interest group or subfield…. [357]
Why business schools nonetheless turned toward
‘‘leadership’’ is explained by Khurana as follows:
By the beginning of the 1990s, business schools—
particularly those elite schools that had staked their
reputations on academic superiority [in the period in
which faculty like McNamara of the Harvard Busi-
ness School had been proclaiming management sci-
ence]—faced a full-blown crisis of identity and
purpose. It was no longer possible for business
schools to tout a mission of educating managers
according to the canons of postwar (i.e., post World
War II) managerialism, for traditional managers had
been successfully portrayed by the takeover artists
and shareholder activists of the 1970 and 1980s [and
others]… as incompetent at best, and venal and
untrustworthy at worst.
Moreover, increasing numbers of students at the most
prestigious schools now shunned traditional man-
agement careers altogether in favor of fields like
consulting and investment banking [to which the
advent of computers had given increased vitality for
better or for worse]. Faculty at the elite business
schools were thus educating fewer future managers,
which left them increasingly ambivalent and uncer-
tain about what they were educating students for…. It
was thus in a pervasive atmosphere of drift and
uncertainty that business schools turned to the notion
of leadership as a way to define their identity and
mission….
In the early 1990s, for example, Harvard Business
School formally shifted its focus from its traditional
concern with general management, issuing a new
mission statement that described its purpose as ‘to
educate leaders who make a difference in the world.’
[352–55]
The economic collapse of 2008, involving many MBAs
from prestigious universities, certainly ‘‘made a differ-
ence.’’ By contrast, an MBA program based on stewardship
of society’s resources would require study and commitment
every bit as demanding as that of medicine or law or any
other graduate study in order to address such questions as
what an environmentally sustainable economy could look
like, or how an economy could free itself from dependence
on trash-producing consumerism and on weapons manu-
facture carried far beyond the actual needs of defense, or
how a society claiming to be an equal opportunity
democracy can eliminate such contradictions as racial
disparities in healthcare or failure to provide to all children
the good schools necessary for full citizenship. Education
for such stewardship, as McNamara discovered in The Fog
of War, would require study of much more than mathe-
matical modeling.
Licensing
The corporate form has over time become too powerful and
too free from limitations to be left unprotected from CEGs,
and licensing would make it harder for corporate officers to
evade individual responsibility if they exploit today’s
corporate form to benefit themselves rather than society.
Therefore, to be sure that people who reach high level
corporate positions without an MBA have passed through
screening similar to the MBA, and to help hold MBA
programs to high standards, society needs its trustworthy
people of business to design and establish licensing cor-
related to the MBA as medical and legal licensing is cor-
related to professional education in those fields. In addition
to an employment history and to performance on exams,
materials to be provided by candidates could include tes-
timonies to the candidate’s competence and commitment to
prosocial stewardship written by appropriate recommend-
ers. What corporate positions would require a license could
be defined by such existing criteria as size of budget con-
trolled, extent of supervision of subordinate departments,
or powers of determining policy or hiring/firing managers.
Conclusion
The United States needs its trustworthy teachers and
practitioners of business to take steps to protect high level
corporate positions from caveat emptor gamesters and to
attract stewards. A major step toward both of these goals
could be developing an MBA curriculum that would be
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attractive to potential stewards and unattractive to potential
CEGs. Promising elements of such a curriculum would be
demanding history courses and internships with prosocial
businesses or non-profit organizations. A closely related
step would be establishment of correlated licensing for
high level corporate positions, whether as managers or
directors.
After reorientation of the MBA and establishment of
licensing, there would still be questions of what greater
provisions society can make to help all children and
especially low reactive/uninhibited children develop into
prosocial adults, of what alternative provisions society can
make for adults who do become caveat emptor gamesters,
and of how the corporate structure itself should be
reformed. But high level executives and directors who were
stewards would help society address these questions.
It would be possible for reform to begin quickly, since it
would not require either government action or massive new
funding. Today’s trustworthy people of business are a
group that includes individuals from our oldest corpora-
tions all the way across to today’s newest ‘‘social entre-
preneurs,’’ as well as many faculty teaching business. If
some among these many trustworthy people of business
will choose to do so, they can start the U.S., and indeed the
world, moving toward a time of greater safety and a more
just, healthful and environmentally sound management of
economic resources, a time when corporations are more
like the hospitals and universities in which prosocial pro-
fessionals practice their callings. ‘‘Let the buyer beware’’
could then come to seem as surprising on the wall of a bank
or other corporation as ‘‘let the patient beware’’ would
seem today on the wall of a physician.
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